



# **FORESIGHT FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

**Phase II: Recommendations for policy action  
Final report**

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## CMI INTRODUCTION



Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) is a Finnish independent non-profit organisation that works to resolve conflict and build sustainable peace across the globe. Founded in 2000 by President and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Martti Ahtisaari, CMI now has a team of over 70 professionals dedicated to conflict prevention and resolution, and field offices in several regions in the world in addition to our offices in Helsinki and Brussels.

As a private diplomacy organisation, CMI works to prevent and resolve violent conflict by involving all actors relevant to achieving peace. We do this by supporting regional mediation capacity and skills, by bringing together local actors and facilitating confidence-building dialogues, by strengthening the sustainability of peace through new approaches, and by rapidly providing flexible mediation support at different stages of the peace process. Our work is based on a strong commitment to long-term processes and collaboration with local partners.

## INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT



### **Foresight for Conflict Prevention in the Middle East project**

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# 1 INTRODUCTION



This report details the outcomes of the second phase of CMI's Foresight project in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. During the first phase, which concluded in early 2012, panels of officials in each target country were convened to discuss long-term trends in society, politics, the economy and the environment, and to identify those that had the potential to develop into civil conflict scenarios in the near or long term. Having identified these high-priority trends, the goal of the second phase was to determine how these trends might be addressed through state policy today, taking into account not only the ideal policy response but also the state's ability to act within its political, security, and fiscal limitations.

To do so, CMI reconvened the panels of officials (including the same individuals from Phase I insofar as this was possible and adding new faces when it was not) to analyse a set of potential policy actions and score them on six indicators. These included the following:

1. Feasibility: can this policy be enacted in the current social/political/fiscal climate?
2. Novelty: is this a new idea, or has it been tried before?
3. Impact on security
4. Impact on economic growth
5. Impact on social cohesion
6. Impact on political stability

Whereas public surveys were used to inform the Phase I discussions, the recommendations analysed in the Phase II panel meetings were based on the results of focus groups conducted by an expert consultant with politically active youth of various ideological persuasions in the three target countries. The focus groups provided a preliminary list of recommendations for the official panels to discuss and score; they were also permitted to bring up new recommendations other than those suggested in the focus groups.

A key element of this project is the participatory methodology CMI has employed. The CMI team members moderating the meetings took pains not to influence the participants or direct them any more than necessary to accomplish the core objectives of the project. This report makes no effort to judge the value or feasibility of the recommended policy actions independently of the participants, and as such should be read not as the opinion of the authors but rather as an insight into how political actors in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon are thinking and talking about today's critical policy issues.



## 2 POLICY BACKGROUND



### 2.1 EGYPT

Policy in Egypt is currently in a transitional period. The constitution approved in December 2012, which will lay the groundwork for new laws, addresses many of the policy issues raised in the focus groups. In some cases, the constitution is specific in stating policy on these issues, whereas in others, it is more vague.

It is also not expected to take immediate effect, especially given the major restructuring of the Egyptian state it entails. Article 235 permits a new local administration system to gradually replace the current one over the course of ten years, although no timeframe is given for the implementation of other systemic changes. It will also take time to establish and provide legal frameworks for the institutions allowed for in the constitution, while many other laws and regulations will have to be written and rewritten; how quickly this process will take and whether it will be successful in fulfilling the sometimes expansive promises made in the constitution cannot be predicted at this time.

The following overview of the policy status quo in Egypt accordingly takes the new constitution as its primary reference and assumes that it will guide policy in the coming years. If an issue is not addressed in the constitution or additional information is needed, other policies or data are referred to.

#### 2.1.1 Socio-political trends in Egypt

##### Guarantees of equality under the law

Equality and equal opportunities are identified in the preamble of the constitution as one of its fundamental principles, “established for all citizens, men and women, without discrimination or nepotism or preferential treatment, in both rights and duties.” Articles 9, 33 and 34 provide further guarantees that “[t]he State shall ensure safety, security and equal opportunities for all citizens without discrimination”; that “all citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public rights and duties without discrimination”; and that “[i]ndividual freedom is a natural right, safeguarded and inviolable.”

##### Clear role for military and security forces

Part III: Chapter Five (Articles 193-198) defines the role of security bodies. The Defence Minister, who is appointed from the ranks of the military, is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and has a seat on the National Security Council (along with the Chief of the General Intelligence Services) and the National Defence Council (along with the GIS chief and an array of senior military officers).

The National Defence Council is responsible for the armed forces’ budget.

Article 198 opens up the way for an independent military judiciary. Civilians may

not be tried in a military court “except for crimes that harm the Armed Forces.”

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is provided for “as regulated by law”, and the constitution allows for further regulations to be defined by law.

##### Transparent monitoring of police personnel

The constitution provides for a police force in Article 199: “a statutory civil body with the President of the Republic as its Supreme Chief. It shall perform its duty in the service of the people, its loyalty being to the Constitution and the law, and its responsibilities to preserve order, public security and morality, to implement laws and regulations, and to safeguard the peace, dignity, rights and freedoms of citizens, all as regulated by law and in a manner that enables Police personnel to carry out their duties.”

Earlier articles detailing the rights of citizens also concern the conduct of the police. Article 35 protects citizens from arrest, detention or investigation without a court order “necessitated by investigations”, except in cases of in flagrante delicto. It requires that detainees “be informed of the reasons in writing within 12 hours, be presented to the investigating authority within 24 hours of the time of arrest, be interrogated only in the presence of a lawyer, and be provided with a lawyer when needed.”

Article 36 requires police to treat anyone arrested or detained with dignity and to inflict “no physical or moral harm” on that person. It labels the violation of this principle an offense punishable by law and declares any statement (such as a criminal confession) obtained under duress or coercion “invalid”. Articles 38 and 39 declare the private life of citizens, their communications and their homes inviolable without a causal judicial warrant.

The constitution does not establish specific bodies or guidelines for monitoring the police or ensuring the enforcement of the rights delineated in Articles 35-39. These remain to be defined by law.

##### Devolving decision-making to local government, guided by law

Articles 183-192 set rules for local administration and the election of local councils, with nearly every article stipulating that its provisions be executed “in the manner regulated by law.” The laws that end up further regulating local government remain to be seen.

Local administrative units, both those outlined in the constitution and those that may be created later by law, are defined as juridical persons, giving them the explicit authority to address public authorities (and publish newspapers), while Articles 185 and 191 give them authority to collect taxes and manage their finances independently.

Article 188 stipulates that “[e]very Local Unit shall elect a Local Council by direct, secret ballot for a term of four years. Representatives from the executive apparatus of the Local Unit shall form part of the Council but have no counted vote.”

It is unclear, however, when these rules will come into force. At the end of the document, Article 235 states that “the existing Local Administration system shall remain in place, and the system laid down in this Constitution applied gradually over the 10 years following the date of its adoption.”

### Restoring the primacy of Al Azhar and the Coptic Church in religious affairs

Article 2 states that the principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of legislation, but Article 219 adds that “[t]he principles of Islamic Sharia include general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community.” These references to Sharia have faced criticism from Egypt’s secular opposition, but defenders point out that Sharia has been referred to in all modern Egyptian constitutions as a matter of course and that the provisions in Article 219 would prevent Islamist agendas outside the Muslim mainstream from becoming law.

Article 3 states that “[t]he canon principles of Egyptian Christians and Jews are the main source of legislation for their personal status laws, religious affairs, and the selection of their spiritual leaders.” Article 4 goes on to designate Al-Azhar as “an encompassing, independent Islamic institution, with exclusive autonomy over its own affairs, responsible for preaching Islam, theology and the Arabic language in Egypt and the world”, prohibits the dismissal of the Grand Sheikh, and instructs that senior scholars there be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law.

### Education reform with focus on civics, citizenship, and media literacy

In Article 58, education is named as “a right guaranteed by the State for every citizen” and public institutions are required to provide all levels of education for free. Primary education is mandatory and the state is instructed to further extend the degree of compulsory education.


The constitution does not speak of education in the terms elaborated on in the focus groups; other than a passing mention in Article 71 of the state’s responsibility to “empower [children and youth] for active political participation”, there is no specific mention of civics, citizenship skills or media literacy as focal points of the education system. Instead, Article 60 states that “religious education and national history are core subjects of pre-university education in all its forms.”

### Independent, internal monitoring body for the media

Freedom of the press is guaranteed in Article 48, “respecting the sanctity of the private lives of citizens and the requirements of national security.” The same article prohibits the closure of media outlets without a court order. “Control over the media is prohibited, with the exception of specific censorship that may be imposed in times of war or public mobilisation.” The following article states that every “juridical person” (including civil institutions, unions, and local government entities in addition to private citizens) has the right to publish newspapers, while the establishment of radio or TV stations and digital media is to be regulated by law.

Article 215 establishes a National Media Council, whose purview includes “establish[ing] controls and regulations ensuring the commitment of the media to adhere to professional and ethical standards, to preserve the Arabic language, and to observe the values and constructive traditions of society.” Article 216 establishes a National Press and Media Association to manage state-owned media institutions and “ensure their adherence to sensible professional, administrative and economic standards.”

Article 202 grants the President the power to appoint the heads of these and other



independent bodies and regulatory agencies with the Shura Council's permission for up to two four-year terms. Only the Shura Council has the power to dismiss them.

The intended membership of these councils is not specified in the constitution; their makeup and level of de facto independence remain to be seen pending their formation.

### Explicit anti-corruption laws with specific penalties

The constitution makes strong statements against corruption, as in Article 22 ("Public funds are inviolable. It is a national duty of the State and society to safeguard them"). Article 204 provides for the establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Commission to set a strategy for combating corruption. Article 205 grants the Central Auditing Organisation "control over state funds and any other body specified by law".

One of the key demands of the youth activists in the focus groups was a national anti-corruption hotline. Such a hotline was established in 2008 but had little tangible effect and it is not clear to what extent it will be revived or reinforced by the new regime.

### 2.1.2 Environmental trends in Egypt

Article 69 of the constitution states that "[a]ll individuals have the right to a healthy environment" and requires the state to "safeguard the environment against pollution, and promote the use of natural resources in a manner that prevents damage to the environment and preserves the rights of future generations".

### Relocating industries out of dense urban areas

Current policy does not appear to be focused on this issue. Such a shift may be a side effect of a policy of geographically balanced development.

### Improving trash collection and instituting a recycling programme

According to the most recent statistics compiled by the Egyptian Environment Agency and published in 2009, Cairo alone produces up to 14,000 tons of municipal waste per day. About 60 per cent of this waste - or 8,000 tons - is collected, managed and disposed of by the zabaleen: self-employed garbage collectors from the city's slums. The rest is supposed to be collected by multinational firms hired a decade ago for waste management, but much of it ends up being dumped in the city's outskirts, the desert, or irrigation canals. President Mohamed Morsi launched the "clean homeland" initiative in July 2012, pledging to fix the country's garbage problem within 100 days. Plans have been announced to rehabilitate old recycling plants around the country, but for Cairo at least, some environmentalists have argued that the best strategy is to take advantage of the existing informal system and workforce represented by the zabaleen.

### Stricter regulation of water use and dumping

Article 19 addresses the issue of water management in general, calling the Nile and other water resources "national wealth" and committing the state to maintaining them, preventing abuse and regulating water use by law. Article 20 commands the state to protect the coasts, seas and other water bodies, as well as monuments and nature reserves.

### Exploring more efficient irrigation methods

This has been a focus of Egyptian policy and international development efforts there since the Nasser era and particularly since the launch of the National Irrigation Improvement Programme in 1984. Several mega-projects are under construction but have faced delays. These include the North Sinai Development Project, the New Valley Project, and the currently frozen West Delta Region Project.

### 2.1.3 Economic trends in Egypt

#### Promoting small and medium enterprises

Small businesses are not mentioned in the constitution. The National Bank said in September 2012 it expected to establish a bank to provide loans for SMEs within six years with \$8 billion in capital. The China Development Bank recently made a \$200 million commercial loan to the National Bank of Egypt to support SMEs. In August 2012, the World Bank approved a \$200 million loan to fund Egyptian SMEs through the Social Development Fund.

#### Improving infrastructure, especially in rural areas

Article 16 reads that "[t]he State is committed to the development of the countryside and the desert, working to raise the standard of living of the farmers and the people of the desert." On infrastructure in general, Article 67 identifies adequate housing, clean water and healthy food as rights.

#### National industrial policy to promote self-reliance

In Article 14, the constitution provides for a planned economy, which "shall be organised in accordance with a comprehensive, constant development plan, ensuring the increase of national income, enhancement of standard of living, elimination of poverty and unemployment, increase of work opportunities, and increase of production. The development plan shall establish social justice and solidarity, ensure equitable distribution, protect consumer rights, and safeguard the rights of workers, dividing development costs between capital and labour and sharing the revenues justly. Wages shall be linked to production, bridging income gaps and establishing a minimum wage that would guarantee decent living standards for all citizens, and a maximum wage in civil service positions with exemptions regulated by law."

Article 17 adds that "[i]ndustry is an essential asset of the national economy. The State shall protect strategic industries, support industrial development, and import new technologies and their applications."

On the other hand, the constitution makes numerous references to the right to private property, which Article 24 declares "inviolable". History suggests that the commitments to central economic planning and property rights may clash.

#### Anti-monopoly and consumer protection laws and regulations

Egypt has a Consumer Protection Agency, established by the Consumer Protection Law of 2006. Amendments to the law were made by the cabinet in January 2011, but were not passed by parliament before the revolution. The agency has not been in the spotlight since then.

### Agricultural and rural industrial policies to promote rural development

Article 15 of the constitution refers to agriculture as “an essential asset of the national economy”, adding that “[t]he State shall protect and increase farmland, work on the development of crop and plant varieties, develop and protect animal breeds and fisheries, achieve food security, provide the requirements of agricultural production, its good management and marketing, and support agricultural industries. The law regulates the use of land, in such a way as to achieve social justice, and protect farmers and agricultural labourers from exploitation.”

An official study conducted in September 2011 found that poverty was increasing, particularly in rural areas. Over 43 per cent of Upper Egyptians were living in poverty, the study found.

### Supporting agricultural cooperatives

Article 23 states that “[t]he State shall support cooperatives in all forms and ensure their independence.” Advocates of cooperatives say they need a better legislative environment to thrive, including policies that make it easier to form companies and import and export goods. The cooperatives are also under-funded.

### Public healthcare reform to expand insurance coverage, control prices

Healthcare is guaranteed in Article 62 as a right of every citizen, and the State is obligated to “provide healthcare services and health insurance in accordance with just and high standards, to be free of charge for those who are unable to pay.” Health facilities must provide emergency medical care to every citizen, and the state is tasked with supervising health facilities and their materials. The constitution stipulates that legislation be drafted to this end.

The big question is whether Egypt can afford to provide universal health insurance coverage, given the current state of its finances. This will depend in part on whether and how the government attempts to control prices in the sector.

### Promoting renewable energy, especially solar power

Natural gas represented 90 per cent of the country’s power generation at the end of the fiscal year 2011, but the government wants 20 per cent of the energy mix sourced from renewables by 2020. Egypt currently generates 547 megawatts of wind energy and 430MW of solar. To meet its clean energy goal, it must increase wind power capacity to 7,200MW by 2020, and solar capacity to 1,000MW. In mid-2012, the World Bank awarded a \$220 million loan to support wind power development. The World Bank said at the time that it estimated Egypt’s wind power potential to be over 10 gigawatts (10,000MW).

### Curtailing energy subsidies to industries

Energy subsidies accounted for a fifth of government spending in the 2011 fiscal year. In early October 2012, the government launched a pilot programme to target subsidies for cooking gas to the needy, as part of a series of economic reforms undertaken to convince the IMF to give the country a \$4.8 billion loan. It also cut subsidies on 95-octane gas and said it would cut subsidies on other grades of fuel in April 2013.

With regard to industrial subsidies, a plan was announced at the end of 2012 to gradually cut the subsidy on fuel oil consumed by industries. The government is currently negotiating an implementation plan with industrialists.

## 2.2 JORDAN

### 2.2.1 Socio-political trends in Jordan

#### Electoral reform

Jordan is scheduled to hold elections on January 23, 2013<sup>1</sup>, to seat a parliament that King Abdullah has said will be responsible for appointing a new government: a historic shift of power from the throne to the legislature. Around 2.3 million Jordanians have registered to vote, according to official figures. The Islamic Action Front and its allies in the opposition plan to boycott the polls, however, arguing that the elections law is rigged to limit the power of parties and ensure that pro-establishment candidates win a majority of seats. Opposition parties complain that they were not consulted in the drafting of the elections law. They have also raised concerns over vote buying, voter intimidation, and overreaches of authority by the independent electoral commission. The current elections law allows each voter to cast one vote for an individual candidate at the district level and a second for a party list at the national level. It provides for a 150-seat lower house of parliament, with 108 seats filled by district-level voting, 27 allocated to the national party lists, and 15 guaranteed for women.

#### National dialogue

A national dialogue committee comprising ministers and representatives of political parties, professional associations, the economic sector, civil society organisations, and youth and women’s societies was formed in March 2011 to make recommendations for reforming the elections and political parties laws based on a broad-based dialogue with Jordanian communities and civil society institutions. A survey conducted in June 2012 found that a majority of Jordanians had not heard of the committee, and major opposition parties panned its proposed elections law for giving too few seats to parties at the national level, although the Islamic Action Front in particular stood to gain seats under the proposed law. Activists and opposition figures unhappy with the elections and political parties laws passed in parliament have accused the government of ignoring the committee’s recommendations when drafting these laws.

#### Political parties

The political parties law passed in June 2012 requires groups to obtain a minimum of 500 founding members to be eligible to register as a political party. The number had been reduced to 250 in the government’s draft, but the senate doubled the minimum and the lower house passed this amendment despite dissension among lawmakers. The law names the interior minister as head of the committee in charge of reviewing ap-

1. At the time of the original report in November 2012. The incumbent prime minister Abdullah Ensour ceremonially resigned and was re-appointed by the king on March 9, 2013. Ensour consulted with MPs over the formation of his government, which at the time of this writing two weeks later, he has yet to form.

plications to form parties, whereas opposition groups wanted the political development ministry to have jurisdiction over this process.

### Corruption

Jordan has held several major corruption trials over the past year. Several ministers were implicated in a case related to a 2007 deal with an investor to build a casino at the Dead Sea, which later fell through. Only one official, former tourism minister Osama Dabbas, was indicted in the case, while the parliament declined to refer any of the other implicated parties to court, leading anti-corruption activists to accuse the government and parliament of railroading Dabbas to protect other officials. Only the parliament has the authority to indict ministers. Similarly, opponents of a decision to investigate former Amman mayor Omar Maani in connection with evidence of corruption in the municipality say more central figures in these corruption cases offered him up as a scapegoat to save themselves. The highest-profile case recently was a November 2012 verdict sentencing former intelligence chief Mohammad Dahabi to 13 years in prison and a JD21 million fine for embezzlement and abuse of public office. Also in November 2012, the cabinet endorsed a draft law on illicit fortunes. The Anti-Corruption Commission, which says it is currently investigating some 80 cases, has been accused of selectivity, but calls these accusations a deliberate smear campaign to discredit the body. The commission does not have the authority to prosecute corruption cases, only to investigate them and refer suspects to court. Anti-corruption activists want the body's mandate expanded. They also have called for the prosecutor general to be given full powers to investigate and prosecute corruption cases without the permission of the legislature or other state bodies.

### Government services

Jordan established an ombudsman in 2009 to expedite the state's response to complaints from the public and improve monitoring of government entities. The ombudsman bureau signed a cooperation memo with its Dutch counterpart in September to improve the capabilities of its staff. The public remains largely unaware of the role the ombudsman plays, however, and some state entities are resistant to the bureau's oversight. Efforts at improving state services otherwise have focused primarily on human resource development and "putting the right person in the right job", rather than automation. E-government services have been introduced in some state institutions, but these efforts have been hampered by a lack of funds. A bylaw on government services issued by the cabinet in August 2012 requires public sector entities to post a list of the services it offers on its websites and take comments and suggestions from citizens online. A national call centre directs enquiries from citizens to the relevant government institution, but most of the calls it receives concern job applications at the civil service bureau.

### Media

Regulation of the media in Jordan suffers from a general lack of specific rules, leaving the government free to decide arbitrarily on the legality of a journalist's actions. The current legal and regulatory framework regarding the press is geared entirely toward

protecting public figures from character assassination, rather than enabling journalists to investigate issues of public concern. There is no clear, restrictive definition of defamation written into law, giving judges broad discretion over whether a published statement is defamatory. There are no legal protections for whistle-blowers or journalists who expose wrongdoing, and investigative journalism is hindered by fears of arrest or harassment by security forces. Recent amendments to the press and publications law require the online media to register with the state and abide by new regulations that press freedom activists say are too vague and restrictive. These amendments, however, were made after some news websites were accused of taking advantage of previously lax regulations, accepting kickbacks and engaging in blackmail. An access-to-information law was passed several years ago but is seldom used.

### Universities

A national strategy for higher education is currently being implemented. One of the major components of this strategy is to decentralise university admissions, allowing students to apply directly to university programmes rather than being admitted through a unified system. The strategy also provides for increasing vocational education for university-age students and moving more academic-stream students into high-demand fields.

## 2.2.2 Environmental trends in Jordan

### Water conservation

A project entitled Community-Based Initiatives for Water Demand Management, implemented by several non-governmental entities with USAID funding, was launched in 2006 to provide loans for water efficiency projects on the community level, such as rainwater harvesting, grey water recycling, rehabilitation of ancient wells, and maintenance of water and irrigation infrastructure. The project has benefitted nearly 30,000 people but concludes next year. Government efforts to promote water conservation have focused primarily on raising awareness of water scarcity, encouraging citizens to use less water, and working with the private sector to promote the use of water-saving devices.

## 2.2.3 Economic trends in Jordan

### Start-up financing

Start-up businesses in Jordan have limited access to credit. Science and technology start-ups can obtain financing from venture capital projects, most notably the Oasis 500 fund, and initiatives by civil society institutions such as the Talal Abu-Ghazaleh Organisation. The terms offered by local venture funds are not necessarily favourable to entrepreneurs, although accepted projects benefit from mentorship and networking activities. These initiatives focus exclusively on IT, and there are no similar start-up funding initiatives for businesses in other sectors. SMEs account for around half of Jordan's GDP and 60 per cent of jobs, according to the Economic and Social Council of West Asia.

## Unemployment

The official unemployment rate in Jordan was 13.1 per cent during the third quarter of 2012, and the IMF expects the rate to remain around 12.9 per cent in 2013, but observers believe the official figures under-report both joblessness and underemployment. Unemployment is notably higher among women and workers with lower education levels.

## Guest workers

Government and independent reports place the number of legal guest workers in Jordan at between 260,000 and 280,000. There are also believed to be some 200,000 illegal foreign workers, including 135,000 Egyptians. Labour officials hope to replace some of these guest workers with Jordanians in order to reduce the unemployment rate, but these efforts are hindered by the fact that guest workers are mostly employed in manual jobs that many Jordanians refuse to do.

## Minimum wage/worker protections

The minimum wage was raised from JD150 to JD190 per month earlier this year, although some workers have complained that their employers do not pay them the minimum wage. Labour advocates say vulnerable workers, including low-skilled and foreign workers, are subjected to overlong working hours, inadequate pay and other exploitive practices. The labour law provides protections for these workers, but advocates say the law is not being enforced properly.

## Rural development

Projects to improve rural infrastructure and services are usually designed on an ad hoc basis in response to immediate demands. A project launched in August 2012 aims to bring the level of state services in rural areas on a par with the capital. A lack of infrastructure, including transportation and education services, has driven investment and workers out of rural areas and into cities.

## Subsidy reform

The government has taken drastic measures to change Jordan's subsidy system to one of cash transfers and targeted benefits to needy families rather than blanket commodity subsidies that also benefit the wealthy. In November 2012, all fuel subsidies were abolished, causing increases in auto fuel and heating/cooking gas prices that led to riots around the country. These subsidies, which previously cost JD800 million a year, have been replaced with JD300 million in cash benefits for citizens with limited incomes.

## Health reform

The health sector has been undergoing reform and development for over a decade, including a project to expand the country's largest hospital and other projects to introduce new services and technologies in public hospitals. However, the timeframes and objectives of these projects change as ministers come and go, and there is no overarching strategy governing the implementation of health sector development projects.

## 2.3 LEBANON

### 2.3.1 Socio-political trends in Lebanon

#### Electoral reform

Seats in the Lebanese National Assembly are distributed on the basis of confessional groups. Each community is allocated a certain number of seats, but voting takes place in geographical districts, so that a voter can, and in many cases, must select a candidate from another community. The system was designed to prevent sectarian competition and encourage cross-confessional cooperation, but has led to allegations of gerrymandering and has rankled confessional groups and political parties that would stand to wield more power in a less balanced system.

The parliament is currently considering several electoral reform proposals and must decide on a new system before the 2013 elections, tentatively set for June, are held. Several proposals have been discussed, including a hybrid system proposed by the National Commission for a New Electoral Law, known as the Boutros Commission, in 2006, under which 77 of Parliament's 128 members would be elected by winner-take-all, and the remaining 51 members would be elected by proportional representation. Another proposal, considered likely to prevail, is known as the Orthodox Gathering law and was proposed by two Christian parties: this law would turn Lebanon into one electoral district and allow citizens to vote only for members of their own confessional group. Opponents of the OG law say it would erode national unity and have vowed to challenge its constitutionality in court if the parliament passes it.

#### Education reform

Lebanon is known for having one of the best education systems in the Middle East, but state spending on education is relatively low for the region at around 1.8 per cent of GDP. However, inequality in access to education matches other developmental disparities between the capital and rural areas. Palestinian refugees also have limited access to adequate education. There are also major disparities in quality between public and private schools.

University graduates lack job opportunities, regardless of the quality of the education they received. Many educated Lebanese still work in low-wage, low-productivity jobs because they are unable to find more suitable employment or their job searches are hindered by unfair hiring practices.

A major point of controversy in the Lebanese education system is the teaching of history. There is no standard history textbook, and the state curriculum does not require schools to teach the history of the civil war in a certain way. This means that students from different regions and communities are taught different versions of a pivotal moment in the country's history, and in some cases are not taught about the civil war in school at all. Critics say the lack of a unified history curriculum potentially inflames sectarian divisions and impedes reconciliation.

#### Truth and reconciliation process

Lebanon has yet to engage in any serious process of reconciliation after the 1975-1990

civil war, in which as many as 200,000 people were killed. The Taif Accords that ended the war did not provide any process of national dialogue or social reconstruction. None of the leaders of the sectarian militias that participated in the war has been investigated for alleged war crimes and some of those suspected of committing atrocities are still active in national politics. There is little expectation that acting politicians will take action to have themselves investigated.

Although its founding reflects the deep divisions with Lebanon and the concurrent inability of its political class to conduct a fair investigation of the 2005 assassination of former prime minister Rafic Hariri, the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon is not related to the truth and reconciliation process insofar as it concerns only Hariri's assassination and other assassinations that preceded it, not the civil war.

### 2.3.2 Environmental trends in Lebanon

#### Technical study of environmental issues

Policy action and other interventions for the environment in Lebanon are hindered by a lack of data, due in part to a lack of reliable public accounting. Major environmental issues include deforestation from logging and burning, overexploitation and pollution of rivers and other water resources, and degradation of the Mediterranean coast, such as the 15,000 tons of fuel oil that leaked into the sea after Israel bombed the Jiyeh power station in 2006. Misuse of irrigation water is also a cause for concern. In addition to creating gaps in essential data, the lack of institutional infrastructure in Lebanon has prevented effective monitoring of environmental issues and execution of relevant policies. Rapid development around water resources and a lack of regulation and enforcement regarding dumping and the use of agrochemicals has degraded water quality.

#### Environmental awareness

Although Lebanon is beset by numerous environmental challenges with serious long-term implications, the environment does not factor heavily into day-to-day news and political discourse. Dozens of non-profit organisations work on environmental issues in Lebanon, in addition to the environment ministry and UN agencies, but these issues still do not receive much exposure; this could in part be a result of more immediately pressing issues like the elections law, sectarian violence and the conflict in Syria monopolising public attention.

#### Alternative energy

The Lebanese government committed itself at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit to raise the proportion of energy it produces from renewable energy to 20 per cent by 2020. So far, little has been done to achieve that goal. There is no institutional framework for regulating Lebanon's energy sector to incorporate renewable resources. International energy firms want laws to establish a regulatory agency for renewable energy and allow the private sector to sell renewable energy, but legislation to that effect has been stalled. Problems with the electricity grid are also cause for concern in implementing a shift to alternative energy.

Wind energy is the most promising renewable resource for mountainous Lebanon. The energy ministry in 2010 published a "wind atlas" showing areas with great potential for wind power exploitation. According to the project, 6,200 megawatts (current demand for electricity stands at around 2,400MW) of electricity can theoretically be produced from wind, but constraints such as land ownership, issues with the electricity grid and other legal factors bring the realistic level of production down to around 400 MW.

### 2.3.3 Economic trends in Lebanon

#### Worker-friendly labour policies

Lebanon's minimum wage is 675,000LBP (around \$450) per month. The labour law offers some other protections, entitling workers to paid vacation, sick leave, bereavement leave, 49 days maternity leave, and prior notice before dismissal. However, the minimum wage only applies after a three-month probation period and paid vacation does not kick in for a year. The standard workweek is 48 hours in six days.

Unions played a prominent role in Lebanon in the 90s, but their influence later waned. Recent strike actions by electricity workers and teachers have shown a newly confident labour movement and may spell the start of a new era of stronger unions.

#### Public sector recruitment reform

Public sector jobs are frequently handed out on the basis of political, sectarian, geographical or family ties in a largely unaccountable system that critics call unfair. Jobs in public institutions are frequently offered as kickbacks for active supporters of winning parliamentary candidates, and, at times, these "jobs" do not involve any actual work. The hiring process is often opaque and subject to little if any oversight. Suggested fixes have included a standardised, blind application process for public sector employment in which the hiring authority is not able to identify the applicant before making a decision.

#### Tax reform

Lebanon's tax system is progressive, but not very. The highest tax rate for personal income, 20 per cent, is levied on income over 120 million LBP (around \$80,000) per year. Corporations and LLCs pay a flat tax of 15 per cent of business income, with the same rate applying to non-residents who generate business income in Lebanon. Sole proprietors and other entities are subjected to a progressive rate structure with a highest rate of 21 per cent for income over 104 million LBP (around \$70,000) per year. Passive investment income is taxed at 10 per cent, as are capital gains arising from the disposition of immovable assets.

#### Social Security reform

The National Social Security Fund takes 23.5 per cent of every employee's salary for its three programmes: retirement savings, health benefits, and family and educational allowances (attached exclusively to the husband's/father's salary except when a woman is widowed or otherwise the sole provider for her family). The NSSF manages \$4.7 bil-

lion in private-sector contributions and offers coverage for approximately 30 per cent of the Lebanese population. The health fund covers 90 per cent of hospitalisation costs and 80 per cent of medication and examinations, but payments are frequently delayed for as long as several months. The family allowance fund reported an accumulated deficit of \$252 million as of the end of last year, while the healthcare fund ran a \$239 million deficit. Only the retirement fund is solvent. The retirement age is 64, while employees can request early retirement at 60.

One of the challenges the NSSF faces is that it is easily “gamed”, for example by listing family members with children as employees in order to recoup the costs of payments into the allowances fund. The other main challenge is simply that employers are putting less money into the system than employees are taking out. Many employers underreport their workers’ income in order to reduce social security payments, and evasion of NSSF registration is common. Suggested reforms include raising the salary caps on contributions to the healthcare and family allowance funds to keep pace with inflation, particularly rising healthcare costs, and stronger monitoring to prevent evasion.

#### SMEs

There are several funds providing financing for small and medium-sized enterprises in Lebanon, including funds set up by international creditors such as the World Bank and national development banks from donor countries. Some of these funds operate regionally, not nationally. Despite the strong interest in this sector in the development industry and among private equity firms, Lebanon’s government has not taken significant steps to create an environment conducive to investment in SMEs.

#### Balanced state investment in industry and agriculture

Despite efforts to stimulate balanced development in the 90s following the civil war, many parts of Lebanon remain underdeveloped, especially compared to Beirut. Development policies are not effectively planned and executed at the national level, leaving the task of building industry and agriculture in the hands of local elites who often engage in nepotism and cronyism. In addition, industry and agriculture play a smaller role in Lebanon’s economy today than they did ten years ago, in light of the rapid growth of the financial and service sectors.

One of the challenges facing any national development policy in Lebanon is the high cost of land due to its limited supply, which drives up the price of investment in land-intensive projects.



### 3 FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS



In addition to their intended purpose of providing insight into the perspective of politically-active youth on how to address conflict-driving trends, the focus groups conducted for the second phase of the Foresight project have given us a better understanding of the relative state of political development and engagement in Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt. Accordingly, they have illuminated potential pathways for further action CMI may pursue in each of these target countries, particularly with regard to strengthening the ability of civil society to constructively participate in the process of policy-making and the reform of state institutions and practices. This brief report addresses some of the lessons we have learned from these focus groups and how these discoveries might translate into future work.

The outcomes of our focus groups reflected the different circumstances with which each of these countries is currently struggling. The state of political and civil society development in each country was correlated with both the number and specificity of political streams we were able to engage in the focus group activity, as well as the focal points and incisiveness of the participants' recommendations. In all three countries, the top priorities identified in the focus groups concerned socio-political issues: participation, democratisation, and the effectiveness of state institutions. In Lebanon, the focus was mainly on reforming the elections law and reviving a constructive and honest national dialogue. The Jordanians were concerned with recalibrating the balance of power within the state through legislative and constitutional tools in order to give the public a greater role in the decision-making process, while Egypt's activists (whose opinions were more diverse) homed in on the need to develop strong foundations for their new regime through constitutional development and ensuring that top-level authority is safely in the hands of a democratically accountable civilian leadership.

In Egypt, where six focus groups were convened, we were able to survey a broad spectrum of the various political ideologies that make up the Egyptian mainstream today, while also measuring the concerns of the country's major religious minority (Coptic Christians). In Jordan and Lebanon, the groups broke down into a smaller number of factions, representing pro-establishment (or pro-ruling coalition), opposition and independent streams. While the participants in these groups were not an exhaustive sample of the political streams active in these countries, it is clear from the findings that the concepts of partisanship and political debate were more highly refined in Egypt than in the other target countries. The Egyptians were better able to address concrete issues with more precise suggestions, while their recommendations were more ideologically consistent and the disagreements among the groups more clearly defined. In Jordan and Lebanon, widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo was detectable in that all groups, regardless of ideological persuasion, generally agreed on the need for major structural reforms but did not dig deeply enough into these issues to show where they differed on the ways and means.

In all three countries, there was a clear focus on the need for structural reforms and, in most cases, the participants did not reach a high level of detail in their ideas for how to achieve these needed changes. The findings illustrated a significant deficit of trust in the state's ability to deal with the challenges each country faces, particularly in Jordan and Lebanon, where the discussions mostly focused on the need to overcome ongoing political crises and an ineffectual or deadlocked system of leadership. A sense of hopelessness or fatigue was tangible, with participants talking more about problems than solutions – specifically, problems with the very nature and makeup of the state system. In Egypt, the activists were no less concerned about the state's capabilities, but were more prepared to offer specific recommendations on how to restructure (or in their case, simply structure) state institutions to achieve this goal.



## 4 WORKSHOP RESULTS



### 4.1 EGYPT

#### 4.1.1 Socio-political policies in Egypt

Participants were split on whether it was feasible to provide effective **legal or constitutional guarantees of equality** (at least superficially, the new constitution does provide for this). The panel saw this as an important goal, with implications for all four indicators, but did not have clear ideas about how it might be achieved. It was not seen as a novel idea. This was identified as a consequence, i.e., a goal that would be strongly affected by other policies.

Regarding the recommendation to **establish a clear role for the military and security forces**, the officials had little to say other than to agree that it was a sensible idea and note that a distinction should be made between the military and police forces in terms of their roles, responsibilities, and powers. This was also identified as a consequence.

**Transparent monitoring of police personnel** was discussed as a complement to defining the role of military and security bodies. It received high scores for impact on security and political stability, as well as social cohesion—in all cases, the scores were higher than for the previous recommendation.

**Devolving decision-making to local government guided by the law** was not discussed in detail but was seen as having potentially positive effects for growth and political stability.

The recommendation to **restore the primacy of al-Azhar and the Coptic Church in religious affairs** engendered much discussion, with participants disagreeing over whether religion and religious institutions currently play too great or too little a role in regulating Egyptian society. Some saw these institutions as potentially useful if they would exercise their moral authority more effectively to support social harmony. Others countered that this should be the role of the state and warned against relying on the mosque and church to produce good citizens. In general, religion was identified as a key factor in Egypt's ongoing social changes and the panel was in favour of the state paying more attention to this issue, even as they disagreed on what the best course of action might be. This recommendation received an especially high average score for impact on social cohesion.

Participants generally agreed that **education reform with a focus on civics, citizenship, and media literacy** was a positive recommendation with good prospects for improving security, social cohesion and political stability. This recommendation received the highest score for novelty and one of the highest for feasibility.

The panel favoured **forming an independent, internal monitoring body for the media** as a feasible means of curbing extremism and promoting constructive political engagement.

Participants supported the recommendations to write **explicit anti-corruption laws with specific penalties and establish a national hotline for corruption complaints**, although the hotline was not seen as having strong effects on any of the four indicators, receiving some of the lowest scores for impact.

**Building economic self-sufficiency to reduce foreign aid dependence** was identified as the most important step Egypt could take toward boosting economic growth, with ramifications for security and social cohesion as well.

#### 4.1.2 Environmental policies in Egypt

The panel favoured **relocating industries out of dense urban areas**, identifying it as a feasible policy change with significant benefits for economic growth.

**Improving trash collection and instituting a recycling programme** received medium to high scores for impact on all indicators except security. Participants indicated that this policy recommendation was relatively feasible but not especially novel.

Participants saw **stricter regulation and monitoring of water use and dumping** as having particularly significant impact on economic growth.

**Exploring more efficient irrigation methods** received one of the highest scores for feasibility and a high score for impact on growth as well, with smaller but significant impacts on social cohesion and political stability.

#### 4.1.3 Economic policies in Egypt

The recommendation to **promote small and medium-sized enterprises** was well received, with participants giving it high scores for impact on economic growth, social cohesion, and political stability. It was also identified as a moderately strong enabler, i.e., having a significant impact on other policies.

**Improving infrastructure, especially in rural areas**, received high scores on all indicators, especially economic growth and social cohesion. It received a slightly higher than average score for novelty.

Following a **national industrial policy to promote self-reliance** was another popular recommendation, receiving high scores for impact on growth, social cohesion and political stability.

Participants saw **laws and regulations to prevent monopolistic practices and protect consumers** as affecting growth and social cohesion, particularly.

**New agricultural and rural industrial policy to promote development** received relatively low scores on all points except impact on social cohesion, in which instance the score was middling. The panel gave similarly low-to-moderate scores to the recommendation of support for agricultural cooperatives.

**Public health care reform** received a high score for feasibility and a relatively high score for novelty. It was seen as having significant impacts across the board, especially on social cohesion and political stability.

**Promoting renewable energy** was also seen favourably, with an especially high score for economic impact.

**Curtailing energy subsidies to industries** was seen as less feasible than most other policy options. The panellists thought it would have only a moderate impact on growth and little impact on other indicators.

## 4.2 JORDAN

### 4.2.1 Socio-political policies in Jordan

**Electoral reform based on dialogue with the opposition** scored the highest among all of the policy recommendations for feasibility, but had one of the lowest scores for novelty (the demand for dialogue-based electoral reform has been a staple of opposition rhetoric for years). This reform was projected to have a significant positive impact on political stability but only a moderate impact on social cohesion and security. Economic growth would not see much direct effect from electoral reform.

Participants saw a **strategy for building citizenship skills** as potentially helping to build social cohesion especially, with moderate effects on the other indicators. It received a middling score for feasibility and was seen as about as novel as most other recommendations. It was also seen as a consequence of the other policies.

**Reviving national dialogue and adopting the recommendations of the national dialogue committee** was not seen as an especially feasible policy choice, but participants felt that it would have a strong impact on social cohesion and political stability.

**Granting more freedom to political parties and making it easier to form and join them** was seen as relatively feasible, but not novel. This policy recommendation would primarily affect political stability, though not as strongly as other major political reforms.

**Equal application of the law** was identified as one of the most important ways Jordan can improve political stability, social cohesion, national security and economic growth alike. Participants were especially enthusiastic about this recommendation, with several giving it top scores on all impact indicators. This policy was seen as highly feasible given adequate political will, and was also seen as a consequence.

**Serious efforts to prosecute corruption cases** received the highest score for novelty among all of the recommendations in all three categories, although it was still low. While acknowledging the important potential impact of anti-corruption activities on security, stability and social cohesion, participants focused especially on the economic benefits of this recommended policy, pointing out that corruption has cost the state vast amounts of money and led to the failure or underperformance of many public works and development projects. Fighting corruption was seen as perhaps the most important step the state needs to take in order to win back the public's trust.

**Automating government services** was one of the least popular policy recommendations, receiving low scores for potential effect on indicators other than economic growth and one of the lowest scores for feasibility. The low feasibility of this policy choice was attributed to the large number of public sector jobs that would be lost to automation, with some participants expressing concern that such a step could not be taken without generating intolerable levels of discontent. In general, participants tended to see this as a broadly constructive but low-priority policy recommendation.

Participants were strongly in favour of **public sector recruitment reform to improve competition and fairness**, envisioning that changing recruitment procedures would have significant positive impacts on growth, social cohesion and political stability. However, this recommendation was seen as the least innovative of them all; it was noted that political and economic reform advocates had called for putting an end to *wasta* (favouritism) in public sector hiring for many years.

The panel drew a link between **clear legal protections and independent monitoring for the media** and political stability, noting the role the media play (or ought to play) in educating the public about government policies, building citizenship skills, and inspiring informed debate over issues of national concern. This policy recommendation was also seen as having potential effects on the other, albeit weaker, indicators.

Participants were optimistic that **university reforms based on the national strategy for higher education** (a process already under way) would continue and be successful, giving this recommendation one of their highest scores for feasibility. They saw this policy change as a boon to social cohesion and stability in particular, with obvious potential to enhance economic growth as well.

### 4.2.2 Environmental policies in Jordan

Both of the environmental policy recommendations presented to the panel – **subsidies for water saving devices and improving water infrastructure and monitoring** – were scored similarly on all counts: somewhat feasible, relatively novel, and having a moderate impact on economic growth with positive social and political side effects. Some participants raised concerns over the potential cost of these policies, as it would be difficult for Jordan to introduce new subsidies while in the midst of an IMF-guided austerity programme. Noting the limited presence of environmental issues in the Jordanian public consciousness, the panel favoured more in-depth study of these issues, especially with regard to water and energy security.

### 4.2.3 Economic policies in Jordan

The panel favoured **making financing available for new businesses** as a public policy, noting that efforts to this effect are already ongoing but are mostly led by private-sector investors. The state can and should play a more active role in encouraging start-ups in high-growth sectors, they said, giving this recommendation high scores for feasibility and impact on economic growth. Interestingly, they also saw support for entrepreneurship as a means of boosting social cohesion and, to a lesser extent, national security, by addressing income inequality and improving economic mobility. This recommendation was seen as a strong enabler, i.e., it would have a significant effect on other policies.

Participants agreed on the need to **collect accurate data on unemployment** and said this was a feasible step the state should take. Noting the deleterious effect the absence of data has had on policymaking with regard to job creation, they said this step would help produce more effective, better-targeted and more pro-labour economic policies. This was identified as a very strong enabler.

**Replacing foreign workers with citizens** did not find much favour among the panellists, receiving the lowest score for feasibility and sub-par scores for impact on all indicators. The officials noted that while doing so would in theory improve the domestic employment situation, it would be very difficult for the government to convince Jordanians to do the menial jobs currently filled almost exclusively by guest workers. Although this very policy choice is part of Jordan's current strategy for addressing unemployment, these participants did not see it as very promising.

**Increasing the minimum wage and providing protection for unskilled workers** was more popular, with participants seeing it as a fairly feasible way to boost economic growth, build social cohesion and (notably) protect national security. Noting that low-

wage workers are prime targets for radicalisation, the panel favoured this set of policy changes as a way to combat poverty, improve civil rights, and build the middle class.

**Incentivising rural investment** received high scores across the board for impact and one of the highest scores for feasibility as well. Participants identified the disparity in wealth and development between Amman and the countryside as a major cause of social discord and unrest and suggested that addressing this imbalance would be not only a good economic policy, but also a boon to stability.

**Improving rural infrastructure, education, and transportation services** was seen as a complementary policy to the preceding recommendation and received similar scores. There was again some concern over the potentially high cost of such endeavours and the state's ability to carry them out successfully. Some participants expressly favoured incentives for private investment over direct state investment, given the fiscal constraints Jordan currently faces.

Participants were in favour of **reforming the subsidy system** to ensure that benefits go to those who need them, which they saw as a highly feasible and necessary policy change with especially strong potential impacts on growth and social cohesion.

**Health sector reform to expand insurance coverage and prevent price fixing** was identified as having a potentially strong effect on social cohesion. This policy recommendation was seen as generally feasible, although concerns were raised over whether the government could stand up to the powerful professional associations representing members of the health sector (doctors, nurses, hospitals, etc.), which have proven effective lobbyists against legislative changes such as the stalled medical accountability law. Health sector reform was also considered a significant enabler.

## 4.3 LEBANON

### 4.3.1 Socio-political policies in Lebanon

Participants saw **electoral reform** as an important step Lebanon must take in order to get out of its current political impasse, but were uncertain as to whether the recommendations of the Boutros Commission were feasible. Others said they were technically feasible but politically impossible given the current level of polarisation. Some panellists mentioned the need to think beyond the electoral law and also deal with regulatory mechanisms and the voting process. This recommendation received a low score for feasibility but the highest for novelty, and was seen as a strong enabler.

The panellists were strongly in favour of **education reform with a focus on civics**, but mentioned the need to also address how religion is taught in schools. They said that further study and more specific policy ideas were needed on this issue. However, it received the highest overall score among all of the recommendations by a long shot, with especially high scores for impact on social cohesion and political stability. This policy recommendation was also seen as a strong enabler.

Regarding the **truth and reconciliation process**, the panellists said that beyond public hearings and community dialogue, there was a clear need to address the way the media play on social divisions and use longstanding resentments for political purposes, for example to attack certain public figures. Participants seemed to believe that it

would be more feasible to regulate the behaviour of the media, e.g., through an honour code, as a means of laying the grounds for a more robust reconciliation process. This recommendation received one of the lowest feasibility scores. As with the preceding recommendations, this was identified as an enabler, albeit a somewhat weaker one.

### 4.3.2 Environmental policies in Lebanon

The panel agreed that **technical study of environmental issues and a serious, national environmental awareness campaign** were important and complementary first steps toward reinforcing the culture of environmentalism in Lebanon. These received high feasibility scores, but low scores for novelty and impact.

Participants tended to view **alternative energy projects using renewable resources** as more of an economic than an environmental concern, noting the general problem of energy scarcity in the country. This recommendation was seen as having strong ramifications, both in terms of economic growth and national security, and the panel recommended folding renewables into a comprehensive energy security policy. This recommendation scored high for economic impact and was identified as feasible. It was also seen as a significant consequence of the other policies.

### 4.3.3 Economic policies in Lebanon

The recommendation of **more worker-friendly labour policies and strengthening unions** was not discussed in detail during the panel meeting. It was not seen as an especially important reform, but received moderate scores for impact on economic growth and social cohesion.

The panel favoured **public sector recruitment reform** as part of a broader public sector development agenda that would also include restructuring to improve efficiency, decentralising decision-making, and rewarding competence to retain good civil servants. This was seen as benefiting both the economy and social cohesion.

The panel pointed out that **reforming tax policies to improve revenues and remove giveaways to foreign interests** had been recommended for years and was already part of the government's current policy programme. As such, this received a low score for novelty, but was seen as eminently feasible and having a very strong impact on economic growth.

**Reform of the social security system** received one of the lowest scores for novelty but a relatively high score for economic impact. It was also seen as having a moderate effect on social cohesion.

**Creating a more encouraging environment for SMEs** received the highest scores of all the recommendations for feasibility and impact on economic growth. Participants saw it having little impact on the other indicators, however.

**A geographically-balanced policy of state investment in agriculture and industry** received a high score for economic impact, with moderate impacts on social cohesion, security, and political stability. This recommendation was identified as a strong consequence.

## 5 CONCLUSIONS



Phases I and II of the Foresight project have given us significant insight into the long-term challenges of greatest concern to three key countries in the Middle East, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, each of which represents a different type of social and political structure. One of the goals of this project is to help guide policy and these findings can certainly be of use to policymakers in the target countries as well as international donors and organisations seeking to make informed choices about how to best direct their attention and resources. While the information presented here is far from complete and raises at least as many questions as it answers, the project has given CMI a much deeper understanding of how activists and officials view the issues facing the region, both where they converge and where they diverge.

At a glance, this data can help identify the policy changes most likely to succeed and to have positive consequences in these three countries. In Egypt, we can see that the country's main concerns are building its economic self-sufficiency and better serving its underdeveloped countryside, including through education and health care reforms that would serve all Egyptians. In Jordan, civil society and civil servants agree that establishing equality under the law is the most important overall goal of (or means toward) reform. There, too, is a clear need for balanced development and innovative efforts to improve access to public goods and services in rural areas, while political change is rooted in building a culture of citizenship. Finally, in Lebanon, these findings suggest that in the eyes of politically-conscious Lebanese, a seemingly simple change like a rethink of the educational curriculum can have ripple effects on society, the economy, and the government.

Of course, there is always the possibility that the participants in these focus groups and panel workshops are wrong, that their priorities are misplaced, or that their reasoning is tainted by ideological considerations or bad information. Yet with each step in the process, we believe that we come closer to ideas that are right and true, and that originate not in the halls of foreign think tanks but in earnest, cooperative, and expertly guided discussion among the citizens of these countries who both make policy decisions and are affected by them. If the Foresight methodology is sound—and past experience in Europe suggests that it is—we can say the same of its outcomes with a high degree of confidence. Of course, this is not a reductive or exclusive approach, and we do not contend that the priority trends and policy recommendations uncovered in these two phases are the only ones that matter. Rather, they provide a framework for understanding the widespread effects of various policies and hopefully represent good starting points for new and innovative ideas about promoting security and development in the Arab world.

The focus of this project remains the prevention of civil conflict. As we move forward, we recognise that this goal must underpin not only the subject matter of constructive research and advocacy, but also the means by which these interventions are carried out. As such, the participatory nature of this methodology has had its own clear

positive effects, which we saw in the appreciation many participants expressed for the opportunity to think about issues of conflict from a new angle and in a collaborative and constructive environment. By acting in good faith with clear and positive objectives, we have made CMI quite a few friends in the Middle East over the course of this project. We hope to build on these partnerships and contacts as we continue to advocate an approach to conflict prevention in the region based not only on data and facts, but also on the fundamental principles of cooperation and participation that have served this project so well.

## LIST OF PARTICIPANTS



### Phase II Workshops

#### Officials – Phase II Workshop in Cairo, Egypt, 26 November 2012

##### Official Participants

Colonel Ayman Ebrahim, Military Intelligence, Armed Forces  
Dr. Zakaria El-Haddad, Special Advisor, Ministry of Agriculture  
Dr. Amr Helmy, Former Minister of Health and Population  
Dr. Khaled Abou Bakr, Special Advisor, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Justice  
Dr. Mohamed El Sayyid, Special Advisor at National Institute of Communications, Ministry of Communications  
Mr. Mohamad Ali, Third Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

#### Officials – Phase II Workshop in Amman, Jordan, 30 November 2012

##### Official Participants

Dr. Wasfi Kailani, Royal Hashemite Court  
Eng. Mohammad Mumtaz Queisi, Commissioner for Tourism and Investment  
Dr. Ammar Huneiti, Advisor to the Minister of Social Development  
Dr. Omar Adwan, Senior Advisor at the Central Bank of Jordan  
Ms. Zein Soufan, Head of Social Studies Division, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation  
Mr. Muin Khoury, Former Media and Communication Advisor, Royal Hashemite Court  
Mr. Amjad Abdelhadi, Former Chief of Cabinet, Prime Minister's Office  
Mr. Raouf Dabbas, Senior Advisor to the Minister of Environment  
Mr. Abdullah Abu Rumman, Former Minister of Media and Communications

#### Officials – Phase II Workshop in Beirut, Lebanon, 28 November 2012

##### Official Participants

Mr. Mohamad Chami, Ministry of Finance  
Judge Elie Maoulouf, Court of Audit  
Mr. Khodor Taleb, Political Advisor to Prime Minister Najeeb Miqati  
Mr. Samir Nahas, Economic Advisor, Prime Minister's Office  
Mr. Raymond Medlg, Legal Advisor to the Minister of Interior and Municipalities  
Mr. Razi El-Haje, Economic Advisor, Ministry of Economy and Trade  
Mr. Ali Berro, Advisor to the Minister of Administrative Reform  
Dr. Khalil Gebara, Political Advisor, Office of former Prime Minister Saad Al Hariri  
Mrs. Raghda Jaber, Economic Advisor, Prime Minister's Office

#### Focus Group Meetings in Cairo, Egypt, 7–8 July 2012

##### Youth Participants, Group One – Nationalist

Mr. Mostafa El Daly, Arab Nationalist  
Mr. Ahmed Al Dab'a, Arab Nationalist  
Ms. Mavie Maher, Nasserist  
Ms. Hoda Abdel Basset, Nasserist  
Ms. Sheri Kamel, Nasserist  
Mr. Yusef Swaleim, Arab Nationalist  
Mr. Mohamed Saad, Nasserist

##### Youth Participants, Group Two – Mixed

Mr. Mostafa Mortada, Nasserist  
Mr. Mamdouh Farag, Muslim Brothers  
Ms. Mirvat Mohsen, Liberal  
Mr. Mohamed Eissa, Liberal  
Mr. Mostafa Showman, Liberal  
Mr. Karim El Saka, Nasserist

##### Youth Participants, Group Three – Civilian

Ms. Heba Yaseen, Civil Society Activist  
Ms. Mona Amer, Civil Society Activist  
Mr. Ahmed Shokr, Civil Society Activist  
Mr. Sheriff Nasr, Civil Society Activist  
Mr. Mohamed Yousef, Civil Society Activist  
Mr. Imad Abdel Kaleq, 6 April Movement, Democratic  
Mr. Ramadan Mohamed, 6 April Movement, Democratic  
Ms. Aya Fahmy, Free Egypt Party  
Ms. Mervat Nassar, Free Egypt Party  
Mr. Mohamad Mosaad, Free Future Party

##### Youth Participants, Group Four – Mixed

Mr. Mohamed Hesham, Jamal Abdel Naser Movement, Communist  
Ms. Omnia Shokr, Socialist  
Mr. Kareem Sameer, Socialist  
Mr. Hady Hammad, Socialist  
Mr. Ahmad El Shahawy, Communist  
Mr. Mohamed Mostafa, Communist  
Mr. Mahmoud Adballah, Independent  
Ms. Nayera El Alem, Independent  
Ms. Amal Mukhtar, Social Democrat

##### Youth Participants, Group Five – Copts

Mr. Hani Elaasar, Researcher, Al Ahram Newspaper  
Eng. Mina Mehanney, Mechanical Engineer, Independent  
Ms. Marianne Magdy, Masr Bokra Organisation  
Ms. Margreet Mossad, Journalist, Watani Weekly Newspaper, and Rouya for Development and Media  
Mr. Rimon Sohdy, Journalist, Rouya for Development and Media Studies, and Al Masr Alyoum Newspaper

##### Youth Participants, Group Six – Muslims

Mr. Muhammad El Zennary, Engineering Student, Helwan University, Freedom and Justice Party, Muslim Brothers  
Ms. Esraa Nasr, Freelance Translator, Freedom and Justice Party, Muslim Brothers  
Mr. Alsawy Mabrouk, Freedom and Justice Party, Muslim Brothers  
Mr. Mossad Hammad, Al Nour Party, Salafist  
Mr. Islam Usama, Pharmacist, Hisham El Bustawisi Campaign  
Mr. Amman El Beltagy, Freedom and Justice Party, Muslim Brothers  
Mr. Aly Mohamed, Political Researcher, Abu El Fottouh Campaign  
Mr. Usama Otafy, Wasat Party

## Focus Group Meetings in Amman, Jordan, 23 June 2012 Youth Participants, Group One – Herak Party

Mr. Hatem Alrshadat, Lawyer  
Mr. Abbas Nawayseh, Secretary General, Diff'a Network  
Mr. Mohammad Bitar, Owner, Intraco Company – Jordan  
Eng. Abdelrahman Hasanien, Executive Manager, Modern Consulting Engineers

### Youth Participants, Group Two – Women

Mrs. Oula Farwati, Senior Correspondent, Al Ahram Weekly  
Ms. Zina Khoury, Freelancer  
Ms. Sandra Hiari, Founder, Tareeq Foundation for Urban Planning  
Ms. Ala' Alhousseini, Regional Initiative Manager, Center for Victims of Torture  
Ms. Majd Suleiman, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, International Youth Foundation  
Ms. Reem Omar, Monitoring and Evaluation, CSP

### Youth Participants, Group Three – Government

Mr. Sami Al Maitah, Assistant Director General for Programs & Communication, All Jordan Youth Commission (AJYC)  
Mr. Amjad Al Krimeen, PR and Media coordinator, All Jordan Youth Commission (AJYC)  
Mr. Ashraf Al-Kawaldeh, Governorates Coordinator, All Jordan Youth Commission (AJYC)  
Mr. Tariq Alnasser, Media, All Jordan Youth Commission (AJYC)  
Mr. Ahnad Al Jribia, Project Director, Al Thorya Center for Studies  
Mr. Yusour Hassan, Director General, Mobadarat for Development  
Mr. Emad Al Shehab, Project Coordinator, All Jordan Youth Commission (AJYC)  
Mr. Mohammad Metleb, Volunteer, All Jordan Youth Commission (AJYC)

### Youth Participants, Group Four – Opposition

Mr. Baker Al Hiyari, Social Capital Advisor, Hamzet Wasel  
Mr. Yazan Jnper, Researcher, Phenia Center for Economics & Information Studies  
Mr. Tamer Zumot, Programme Coordinator, Foundation for the Future

## Focus Group Meetings in Beirut, Lebanon, 30 June 2012 Youth Participants

Mr. Iad Shahrour, Freelance Writer  
Mr. Salam Andary, Freelance Journalist  
Mr. Moustafa Shaar, Director, Association of Human Rights  
Mr. Hratch Hasserjian, Manager, Sarkis Hasserjian International Trade Company  
Mr. Ayman Mhanne, Coordinator, Tajaddod Youth Organisation  
Mr. Omar Abdul Samad, Advocacy Development Specialist, Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE)  
Mr. Khodor Salameh, Freelance Social Media Strategist  
Mr. Assad Thebian, Social Media Consultant  
Mr. Gilbert Doumit, Managing Partner, Beyond Reform & Development  
Mr. Mahmoud Ghazayel, Editor/Journalist  
Mr. Maher Abou Shackra, Research Director, Research for Studies & Consultancy  
Mr. Hadi Mounla, Technical Engineer, Elianor Lift Group  
Ms. Mayada Abdallah, Assistant Manager, Civil Society Movement, Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE)  
Mr. Bassam Chit, Socialist Forum  
Ms. Ousmat Faour, Production Manager, Design and Fashion Company  
Ms. Neamat Bader El Deen, Journalist, Sawt Al Sha'ab Radio  
Ms. Rudy Sassine, Researcher, Lebanese for Economy and Development (LEAD)  
Mr. Michel Abu Rached, International Writer, MTV  
Mr. George Melhem, March 14 Movement  
Ms. Lea Baroudi, March 14 Movement  
Ms. Saana Azzi, Managing Partner, Highways Productions  
Ms. Dala Ghandour, Lawyer  
Ms. Joulia Bou Karroum, Human Rights Education Coordinator, Amnesty International  
Ms. Elham Moubarak, Director, Lebanese Women's Assembly

## DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS AND TRENDS



**Conflict:** 1) intrastate, i.e. state versus community, violence or conflict, 2) communal, i.e. community versus community, violence or conflict

**Trend:** a socio-political/economical/environmental driver that may contribute to the development of a violent conflict

**Development:** a specific chain of events starting from a trend(s) leading to a serious conflict

### Examples:

#### Refugees

**Trend:** The country has seen a massive, sudden influx of refugees enter its borders from a neighbouring country where an international intervention has sparked widespread violence.

**Development:** The refugee population does not integrate with the local population, who resent the presence of large numbers of refugees. The displaced persons are barred from employment and rely on international community support, which dries up, leading them to demand that the local government assist them. The local population rejects this, and clashes ensue between locals and refugees.

#### Unemployment

**Trend:** The country's economy is unable to provide sufficient jobs for its working-age population. The country's population has a large proportion of men and women aged between 18 and 35.

**Development:** Stagnant employment leaves large portions of an increasingly young population without jobs, causing popular frustration and making these unemployed youth susceptible to radicalisation. Skilled workers are leaving the country en masse due to a lack of job opportunities, causing "brain drain" and shortages in key services such as health care and education. The government is unable to cover the costs of social services for the unemployed poor, leading to widespread protests that turn violent.

### 1) Socio-political trends

#### A) Governance and rule of law

Radicalisation of society and political mobilisation

- Trend related to political parties and groups using non-violent and violent extra-parliamentary means of pursuing political goals, such as street protests or terrorism.

Failing/fragile statehood and decline of state

- Trend related to inability of the state to fully provide security, services and participation, as well as to create legitimacy. Often links with increase in authority and loyalty towards non-state groups, identities and entities.

Problems of political participation and democracy

- Trend related to increase and decrease in democratic governance, especially in political participation and elections.

Changes in rule of law

- Trend related to increase and decrease in rule of law, especially related to applying and enforcing the law.

Corruption

- Trend related to high levels of corruption: legal, administrative and financial.

Increase in communal tensions

- Trend related to revival of ethnic, religious, tribal, clan and sect-related loyalties by citizens, as well as the increase in political and economic competition and identity-related tension between these groups.

#### B) Population trends

Demographic growth

- Trend related to rapid increase in youth population and decrease in elderly.

Rural-urban migration

- Trend related to migration from rural areas to urban areas.

Immigration and brain drain

- Trend related to immigration of both educated and uneducated populations abroad.

Refugees/forced displacement

- Trend related to increase in amount of political refugees and internally-displaced persons because of wars and conflicts within any country or in the region.

### C) Transnational trends

#### International interventions

- Trend related to high degree of external penetration and likelihood of military, political or economic intervention by an external party.

#### Regional interventions

- Trend related to high degree of influence of regional actors in political developments in any given country and likelihood of military, political and economic intervention by a regional party.

#### Unresolved conflicts

- Trend related to high degree of unresolved conflicts in the region that continue to influence international, regional and domestic politics.

#### Non-state actors

- Trend related to existence of non-state actors powerful enough to influence international or regional politics and domestic politics of the countries in the region.

#### Organised crime

- Trend related to increase in organised crime, such as drug trafficking.

## 2) Environmental trends

#### Climate change

- Trend related to increase in global temperature, expected decline in rainfalls, and increase in extreme weather conditions in the Middle East.

#### Drought and other water-related issues

- Trend related to lowering levels of availability of water because of decrease of rainfall, bad water management and exhaustion of water reserves.

#### Pollution

- Trend related to pollution of air, water and nature.

## 3) Economic trends

### A) State-driven trends

#### Quality of public education

- Trend related to poor level of public education.

#### Quality of public health/social services

- Trend related to poor quality of public health and social services, including basic and specialised health-care, social security and pensions.

#### Privatisation

- Trend related to privatisation of state-owned industries and other businesses.

#### Changes in state subsidies

- Trend related to high levels of state subsidies in basic commodities and cuts in subsidies due to economic restructuring.

#### Unemployment

- Trend related to high levels of unemployment, especially among the youth.

### B) Market-driven trends

#### Poverty and income inequalities

- Trend related to wide poverty and income inequalities.

#### Changes in level of rents (oil, foreign aid or other)

- Trend related to significant changes in revenues to the state from hydrocarbons, foreign aid or other sources of rent, influencing state budget and political economy of a given country.

#### Changes in foreign investment

- Trend related to significant increase or decrease in foreign investment, influencing political economy of a given country.

#### Changes in worker remittances

- Trend related to significant increase or decrease in worker remittances, influencing levels of welfare and economic development of any country.

## CRITERIA DEFINITIONS AND SCALES



### Phase II – Policy Recommendations

#### Impact

##### Impact on security

How strong impact the policy action has on the security of the country

##### Impact on economic growth

How strong impact the policy action has on the economic growth of the country

##### Impact on social cohesion

How strong impact the policy action has on the social cohesion of the country

##### Impact on political stability

How strong impact the policy action has on the political stability of the country

##### Cross impact

How strong impact the policy action has on other policy actions

##### Impact scale:

- 5 Very strong negative impact
- 4 Strong negative impact
- 3 Rather strong negative impact
- 2 Moderate negative impact
- 1 Small negative impact
- 0 No significant impact
- 1 Small positive impact
- 2 Moderate positive impact
- 3 Rather strong positive impact
- 4 Strong positive impact
- 5 Very strong positive impact

#### Feasibility

How feasible the policy action is in view of available resources and political realities

##### Feasibility scale:

- 0 Not feasible at all
- 1 Not very feasible
- 2 Somewhat feasible
- 3 Feasible
- 4 Very feasible
- 5 Extremely feasible

#### Novelty

How novel the policy action is in the current national political environment

##### Novelty scale:

- 0 Not novel at all
- 1 Not very novel
- 2 Somewhat novel
- 3 Moderately novel
- 4 Very novel
- 5 Extremely novel

## LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS



### Phase II – Policy Recommendations

#### Egypt

##### **A. Socio-political trends**

- A1. Legal/constitutional guarantees of equality under the law
- A2. Clear role for the military and security forces
- A3. Transparent monitoring of police personnel
- A4. Devolving decision-making to local government guided by the law
- A5. Restoring the primacy of al-Azhar and the Coptic Church in religious affairs
- A6. Education reform with focus on civics, citizenship, and media literacy
- A7. Independent, internal monitoring body for the media
- A8. Explicit anti-corruption laws with specific penalties
- A9. Establishing a national hotline for corruption complaints
- A10. Building economic self-sufficiency to reduce foreign aid dependence

##### **B. Environmental trends**

- B1. Relocating industries out of dense urban areas
- B2. Improving trash collection and instituting a recycling programme
- B3. Stricter regulation and monitoring of water use and dumping
- B4. Exploring more efficient irrigation methods

##### **C. Economic trends**

- C1. Promoting small and medium enterprises
- C2. Improving infrastructure, especially in rural areas
- C3. National industrial policy to promote self-reliance
- C4. Laws and regulations to prevent monopolistic practices and protect consumers
- C5. New agricultural and rural industrial policy to promote rural development
- C6. Supporting agricultural cooperatives
- C7. Public health care reform to expand insurance coverage, control prices
- C8. Promoting renewable energy, especially solar power
- C9. Curtailing energy subsidies to industries

#### Jordan

##### **A. Socio-political trends**

- A1. Electoral reform based on dialogue with opposition
- A2. Strategy for building citizenship skills
- A3. Reviving national dialogue and adopting committee's recommendations
- A4. Granting more freedom to political parties, making it easier to form and join them
- A5. Equal application of the law
- A6. Serious efforts to prosecute corruption cases
- A7. Automating government services
- A8. Public sector recruitment reform to improve competition, fairness
- A9. Clear legal protections and independent monitoring for the media
- A10. University reforms based on national strategy for higher education
- A11. Explore new international partnerships

##### **B. Environmental trends**

- B1. Subsidies for water saving devices
- B2. Improving water infrastructure and monitoring

##### **C. Economic trends**

- C1. Making financing available for new businesses
- C2. Collecting accurate data on unemployment
- C3. Replacing foreign workers with citizens
- C4. Increasing minimum wage and protections for unskilled workers
- C5. Incentivising rural investment
- C6. Improving rural infrastructure, education and transport services
- C7. Reform subsidy system to ensure benefits go to those who need them
- C8. Health sector reform to expand insurance coverage, prevent price fixing

#### Lebanon

##### **A. Socio-political trends**

- A1. Electoral reform: draft law proposed by the Boutros Commission in May 2006
- A2. Education reform with focus on civics to promote citizenship, social cohesion
- A3. Truth and reconciliation process with public hearings, community dialogue

##### **B. Environmental trends**

- B1. Technical study of environmental issues
- B2. Serious national environmental awareness campaign
- B3. Alternative energy projects using renewable resources

##### **C. Economic trends**


- C1. More worker-friendly labour policies: protecting unions and preventing discrimination
- C2. Public sector recruitment reform with focus on meritocracy, fair competition
- C3. Rethinking of tax policies to improve revenues, remove giveaways to foreign interests
- C4. Reform of social security system
- C5. More encouraging environment for SMEs
- C6. Geographically balanced policy of state investment in agriculture and industry

# VISUALISATIONS OF WORKSHOP ASSESSMENTS



## EGYPT


### Prioritisation




The **policy prioritisation bar chart** above describes the average scores given to the policies with respect to each of the following six criteria – Feasibility, Novelty, Impact on Security, Impact on Economic Growth, Impact on Social Cohesion and Impact on Political Stability. The widths of the differently coloured bars represent the criteria scores of the policy. The total width of the bar represents the total score of the policy if each criterion is thought to be equally important.

The highest scoring policies, education reform (A6) and public health care reform (C7), have high criteria scores with respect to all the six decision criteria. Thus, they are likely to have a high total score without respect to how the criteria are weighted.


### Cross Impact Analysis



The **policy sink-source chart** above shows the difference between the total cross impact caused by the policy and the total cross impact received by the policy from the other policies. Positive values indicate that the policy has more effect on others than others have on them. These policies are called **enablers** or **sources**. Negative values indicate that other policies have more effect on the policy. These policies are called **consequences** or **sinks**.



The **policy influence/dependence chart** above is used to plot the policy dependence (total cross impact received) to the horizontal axis and policy influence (total cross impact caused) to the vertical axis to produce a two-dimensional chart of total cross impact. Policies above the dashed line are enablers/sources, and policies below the line are consequences/sinks.




The **cross impact network graph** above shows all cross impact scores that are higher than a hand-picked threshold value of 3.7 (chosen so as to produce a visually understandable graph). The graph describes the structure of the strongest link-ages between the policies. Stronger connections are shown with bolder lines.

Most of the policies have rather uniform dependence and influence values, and are located in the centre of the policy influence/dependence chart. The notable exceptions are guarantees of equality under the law (A1) and clear role for military and security forces (A2), which are mostly consequences of other policies, and promoting small and medium-sized enterprises (C1), which is a strong enabler of the other policies.

## Jordan


### Prioritisation




The **policy prioritisation bar chart** above describes the average scores given to the policies with respect to each of the following six criteria – Feasibility, Novelty, Impact on Security, Impact on Economic Growth, Impact on Social Cohesion and Impact on Political Stability. The widths of the differently coloured bars represent the criteria scores of the policy. The total width of the bar represents the total score of the policy if each criterion is thought to be equally important.

Equal application of the law (A5) scores very highly with respect to all impact criteria (security, economic growth, social cohesion, and political stability). A similar situation can be seen with the next two high scoring policies, incentivising rural investment (C5) and improving rural infrastructure, education and transport service (C6). Therefore, varying the criteria weights is unlikely to produce great changes in the list of best scoring criteria.


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


The **cross impact network graph** above shows all cross impact scores that are higher than a hand-picked threshold value of 3.8 (chosen so as to produce a visually understandable graph). The graph describes the structure of the strongest linkages between the policies. Stronger connections are shown with bolder lines.

In general, the socio-political policies are seen as significant consequences of other policies, while economic policies are seen as enablers of the other policies. While this structure cannot be seen clearly from the cross impact network graph, the graph does produce a clearer picture of the flow of impact from the enabler policies such as C2 and C5 to the consequential policies such as A2, A5 and A6.

## LEBANON


### Prioritisation




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The top scoring policy, education reform (A2), has high scores in all six criteria. It is therefore likely to be the best scoring policy no matter which policy weights are used.


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The **cross impact network graph** above shows all cross impact scores that are higher than a hand-picked threshold value of 3.0 (chosen so as to produce a visually understandable graph). The graph describes the structure of the strongest linkages between the policies. Stronger connections are shown with bolder lines.

The policies seem to be quite clearly divided to enabler policies and consequence policies. Especially socio-political policies (A1, A2 and A3) are evaluated as strong enablers, while environmental policies (B1, B2, and B3) are seen as consequences. The network graph shows that many policies are strongly clustered with respect to cross impact – for example, environmental policies all have strong impact on each other.

# CMI

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